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RECENT CASEBS
is an assessment of "future damages." It is submitted that this
displays a misconception of the foundation for recovery. Though
legally not a nuisance because authorized by law, Spencer v. Pt.
Pleasant & Ohio River Ry. Co., 23 W. Va. 406, 427; Watson v.
Fairmont Ry. Co., 49 W. Va. 528, 540, 39 S. E. 193, still it is
in fact a nuisance which, for reasons of public policy, may not be
abated. Geer v. Durham Water Co., 127 N. C. 349, 37 S. E. 474,
475. The person injured has a right of action for damages suffered
by what is in its nature an exercise of the right of eminent do-
main to establish a nuisance as an easement over the plaintiff's
property. Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W. Va. 787, 799; City of
Nashville v. Comer, 88 Tenn. 415, 12 S. W. 1027, 1029. The dam-
ages awarded are not future damages because: first, as held in the
principal case, the immediate depreciation in the value of the prop-
erty is damage already suffered; second, future damages are often
in such cases not ascertainable; and, third, since in fact a nuisance,
the rule should hold that damages created by a nuisance are not
recoverable until suffered. See WOOD, NuisAxcEs, 2 ed., 1001;
Luther v. Winnisimmet Go., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 171, 175.
nmES AND MnNGi - Om AND GAS LEASE - DIVsON OF RoY-
ALTY ON LEASE BY ADJOn NG LANDOWNERS.- Owners of several
adjoining tracts of land leased their tracts jointly as a single par-
cel for the purpose of producing oil and gas. A producing well
was drilled on the land of the defendant who claimed all of the
royalty. Held, that the total royalty must be divided among all
the lessors in the proportion that the area owned by each bears to
the whole tract. Lynch v. Davis, 92 S. E. 427, (W. Va. 1917).
The principal case differs from the ease of Wettengel v. Gorm-
ley, 160 Pa. St. 559, 28 Atl. 934. In the latter case a tract was
leased for oil and gas purposes and later devised in three portions
to the lessor's three sons, thus severing the reversion, and it was
held that the royalties should be divided equally among the devi-
sees. In ordinary leases if the reversion is severed the general
rule is that the rent must be apportioned according to the respec-
tive value of the parts. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 175;
UNDERmL, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 341. "This rule is not appli-
cable to oil and gas leases, however, since the lessee has a right to
take a part of the realty itself, instead of having the mere use of
the premises as in the ease of an ordinary lessee. Where there has
been a severance of the reversion of an oil and gas lease into two
or more parts, two cases have held that the owner of each part is
entitled to all of the royalty from the mineral produced on his
soil. Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Go. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St.
259, 67 N. E. 494; Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil and Gas Co.,
103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122.. It would seem that these cases lay
down the correct rule where the conveyance or conveyances which
sever the reversion do not make provision for the division of the
royalty, and such rule was approved by way of dictum in Rymer
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v. South. Penn Oil Co., 54 W. Va. 530, 46 S. E. 559. Obviously
none of the above cases are like the principal case. The only sim-
ilar case found is Higgins v. California Petroleum Co., 109 Cal.
304, 41 Pac. 1087, but in that case while there was a lease by two
landowners, it does not appear that the area of each parcel was-
the same. The court held there was a presumption that the royal.
ties were to be divided equally and this was supported by the fact
that the parties had so interpreted the contract up to the time of
the dispute. Since it does not appear that the parcels were equal
in area the rule laid down is not the same as that of the principal
case which divided the royalty in proportion to the areas of the
several tracts. It is submitted that since the lessee in the principal
case has the right to develop any part of the entire tract and can-
not be compelled to protect any particular parcel from drainage
the conclusion reached by the court is sound.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - NuNc PRO TUNc ORDER - FUNc-
TION AND NATURE - WHEN ENTERED. - In a proceeding, by way
of motion, for execution on a forthcoming bond, the plaintiff had
judgment below and a writ of error was awarded to the defendant.
The defendant appeared for the purpose of making a motion to
set aside the verdict and to grant him a new trial, but the court,
being engaged in other matters, did not entertain such motion,
or direct any order to be filed, or pass upon or file the motion. At
a subsequent term, the court entered a nunc pro tune order filing
the motion for a new trial, overruling the same, and showing the
defendant's exceptions. Held, that the writ of error granted by
the lower court be dismissed on the ground that a nunc pro tune
order cannot be entered to make the action of the court speak as
of a date different from the day upon which such action took place.
Payne v. Riggs, 92 S. E. 133 (W. Va. 1917).
The power of courts to make entry of orders or judgments
nunc pro tunc has been exercised from the earliest times. Weather-
man v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 796, 22 S. E. 349. The function of
a nunc pro tunc order is to make the record of the court speak the
truth. Payne v. Riggs, supra; O'Sullivan v. People, 144 Ill. 604,
32 N. E. 192. At common law, the judge might, while the pro-
proceeding was in the breast of the court, amend the record so as
to make it truthfully set forth what had occurred, but this could
not be done after the term at which final judgment was rendered.
This rule resulted in such hardship that relief was given by early
English statutes, which are the sources of our practice as to nune
pro tune orders. See 17 ENCY. PL. AND PR. 919. A nunc pro
tunc entry is a present entry of something which was actually
done previously, but to have effect as of the former date. The
principal case shows that its office is not to supply omitted action
of the court, but only to supply an omission from the record of
action already had, which was omitted from the .record through
inadvertence or mistake. Perkins v. Haywood, 132 Ind. 95, 31
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